doi: 10.24151/2409-1073-2023-1-60-66
Abstract. Corporate governance is considered as an eff ective management model for large
businesses and non-profi t enterprises. It is noted that the eff ectiveness of corporate governance is
based on the mechanism of checks and balances and the distribution of powers and responsibilities
between companies’ agents (managers) and owners (shareholders, benefi ciaries). It is emphasized
that such a confi guration, in addition to positive eff ects, generates a principal-agent problem as an
inevitable consequence of the features of the management system. It has been concluded that, being
potentially virtually unavoidable, the principal-agent problem can be prevented and leveled. It
is shown that one of the eff ective mechanisms for solving the principal-agent problem is to ensure
transparency of the company’s management activities.
Keywords: corporate governance, business, management, agent theory, principal-agent problem,
confl ict of interest, agent, principal, shareholder, profi t, costs
For citation: Kostenko N. N. “Principal-Agent Problem in Corporate Governance: Essence,
Causes, Main Approaches to Resolution”. Economic and Social Research 1 (37) (2023): 60—66. (In
Russian). https://doi.org/10.24151/2409-1073-2023-1-60-66
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